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Financial Innovation, Investor Behavior, and
Arbitrage: Evidence from the ETF Market
Abstract
Regular and levered ETFs are markedly different financial innovations. Regular ETFs
improve liquidity: they are more liquid than their underlying stocks. In contrast, although
the levered ETF market has a substantially higher turnover, it also has a significantly
higher bid-ask spreads and larger price impacts. Our interpretation is that levered ETFs
are appealing to short-term levered speculators. The aggregate cost levered ETF investors
incur is around 10% of the market capitalization, or around $2 billion, each year. Moreover,
regular ETF investors appear to be momentum traders, while levered ETF investors are
contrarians: For regular (levered) ETFs, their monthly fund flows are strongly positively
(negatively) correlated with past returns. Finally, arbitrage forces push ETF prices partially
towards their NAVs, and this mechanism is less effective for levered ETFs than for regular
ones.
JEL Classification Numbers: G11, G23.
Keywords: Financial Innovation, Leverage, Investor behavior, Index.
1 Introduction
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are becoming an increasingly significant asset class in the
last two decades. The aggregate market capitalization is around $2 trillion at the end
of 2014. One interesting recent development is the emergence of levered ETFs. Levered
long ETFs attempt to provide daily returns that are 2 or 3 times of the returns of their
benchmark indices, while levered short ETFs, or inverse levered ETFs, attempt to generate
daily returns that are –2 or –3 times of their index returns. Since the introduction of levered
ETFs in June 2006, the total market capitalization has been growing steadily, and is over
$30 billion at the end of 2014. For convenience, we will refer to levered long and levered
short ETFs as “levered ETFs,” and refer to those without embedded leverage as “regular
ETFs.”
These innovations offer an opportunity to study a number of issues. For example,
one prominent theory of financial innovation emphasizes the motive to create “information
insensitive” securities to reduce adverse selection and enhance market liquidity (see, e.g.,
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)). On the one hand, regular
ETFs appear consistent with this insight, since index returns are less sensitive to firm-
specific information. On the other hand, levered ETFs seem to aim for the opposite: they
increase information sensitivity through embedded leverage. How do these features affect
market liquidity? How much do investors pay to use these financial innovations? Moreover,
the ETF market offers a nice setup to study investor behavior. For example, how do
ETF investors respond to past returns? When an underlying index increases, do investors
move to the long or the short side of levered ETFs? Finally, the ETF market also offers
an opportunity to analyze limits of arbitrage, since we can observe both ETF prices and
fundamental values—net asset values (NAVs). For instance, how do ETF prices track their
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NAVs over time? Is there a difference across regular and levered ETF markets? This paper
addresses the above questions and our main findings are the following.
First, consistent with the insight from Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), we find that regular
ETFs are significantly more liquid than their underlying stocks. Specifically, for each regular
ETF, we identify the index that the ETF tracks, and the underlying stocks for that index.
We find that the average turnover is 21% per month for the underlying stocks, but is 235%
per month for their corresponding ETFs. The average bid-ask spread is 8.0 basis points
for the underlying stocks, but is only 5.0 basis points for the ETFs. The average of the
logarithm of Amihud (2002) liquidity ratio is −2.53 for the underlying stocks and −2.85
for the ETFs. Note that the liquidity ratio measures the price impact in a market. A
higher liquidity ratio means a larger price impact, and hence a lower market liquidity. That
is, compared to the underlying stocks, regular ETFs are more liquid—they have higher
turnover, smaller bid-ask spreads and smaller price impact. For all three measures, the
t-statistics for the differences between the regular ETFs and their underlying stocks are
well above 3.
How about the levered ETFs? Holding underlying indices constant, the average turnover
is 2.68 times per month for regular ETFs, but is 6.42 times per month for levered ETFs;
That is, the turnover in the levered ETF market is several times higher than that in the
regular ETF market. However, this does not imply that the levered ETF market is more
liquid. We find that levered ETFs have significantly higher bid-ask spreads and larger
price impact. The average bid-ask spread is 3.1 basis points for regular ETFs, but is 9.9
basis points for levered ones. Similarly, the average log liquidity ratio is −4.1 and −1.86
for regular and levered ETFs, respectively. For all three measures, the t-statistics for the
differences between regular and levered ETFs are well above 5.
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Second, our evidence suggests that despite the high bid-ask spreads and large price
impacts, levered ETFs are appealing to some investors who are interested in very short-
term levered speculation. Indeed, the average holding period is about 3 days in this market.
Hence, levered ETF investors pay a significant cost to access this market. Our estimated
cost is around 10% of the market capitalization, or more than $2 billion, per year.1 To assess
the cost to levered ETF investors, we utilize a special feature in this market: Levered ETFs
are usually issued in pairs. For each index, one ETF aims to provide x-time (x = 2, 3) daily
return of the index, while the other aims to provide −x-time daily return of the same index.
This offers an easy way to assess costs. Consider a portfolio which invests $1 in each ETF,
and re-balances daily to keep the same exposure to the two ETFs. For convenience, we refer
to this portfolio as a “long-long” portfolio. If the two ETFs deliver the returns they are
designed to generate, this portfolio return should always be zero regardless of the underlying
index return. In our sample, however, the average return of this portfolio is −2.31% per
year. Hence, one can interpret this as levered ETF investors facing a cost of 2.31% a year.
Note that this measure does not include the costs investors incur when they trade in the
secondary market. In our sample, the average turnover of levered ETFs is around 6.42
times per month. Hence, a bid-ask spread of 9.9 basis points implies a transaction cost of
roughly 7.63% (= 6.42 × 12 × 9.9 b.p.) per year. Therefore, the total cost that levered
ETF investors incur is, at least, 9.94% (=2.31%+7.63%) per year. This amounts to over $2
billion for the market size towards the end of our sample.
Third, in aggregate, regular ETF investors appear to be momentum traders, while
levered ETF investors appear to be contrarians. For a regular ETF, a one percent increase
in the underlying index return is, on average, accompanied by inflows of 43.1 basis points
(t = 10.08) in the next month. That is, regular ETF investors appear to be trend chasers. In
1As a comparison, French (2008) finds that “investors spend 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market
each year searching for superior returns.”
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contrast, levered ETF investors are doing the opposite. On average, a one percent increase
in the fund return is accompanied by a 12.4 basis points outflow next month. That is,
investors appear to be betting on the reversal of the fund return. Moreover, investors’ fund
flows are not justified by future returns. If anything, our evidence suggests that investors,
in aggregate, trade in the “wrong” direction in the levered ETF market: fund flows appear
to be negatively correlated with the future returns.
Fourth, the average premium in our sample is less than one basis point, suggesting that
arbitrage forces are effective in bringing ETF prices towards their NAVs and that there
is no mispricing on average. However, there is significant time variation in this premium.
ETF returns appear to under-react to NAV-implied returns. Specifically, when the NAV of
an ETF increases (or decreases) by 1%, the ETF price increases (or decreases), on average,
by only 94 basis points. Arbitrage forces do not perfectly peg the price of an ETF to its
NAV. Rather, NAV is the “moving target”, to which arbitrage forces partially push the
ETF price. This is a sensible strategy when arbitrageurs face costs when setting up their
trades, similar to the intuition in the literature of optimal portfolio choice with transaction
costs. For example, as in the model of Garleanu and Pedersen (2012), in an environment
with predictable return and transaction costs, the optimal strategy is to “trade partially
towards the current aim”. Moreover, also consistent with this model, we find that the prices
of levered ETFs converge to their NAVs more slowly than those of regular ETFs. For a
regular (levered) ETF, when its NAV increases by 1%, its price increases by 0.97% (0.94%).
Our paper adds to the literature that emphasizes the role of financial innovation in
facilitating speculation by showing that levered ETF investors appear to be willing to pay
a large cost for trading in this market (Frazzini and Pedersen (2012), Simsek (2013), Shen,
Yan and Zhang (2014)). Our paper is also related to the literature on ETFs. Bhattacharya
et al (2013) analyze the effect of ETF on retail investors’ trading behavior. Petajisto (2011)
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examines the efficiency of ETF pricing. Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2012) analyze
the role of ETF in propagating shocks across markets, Da and Shive (2015) analyze the
asset return correlations caused by ETFs. Yao and Ye (2015) study the effect of share split
on the market liquidity of levered ETFs. Lu, Wang, and Zhang (2009) studies the long
term returns of levered ETFs.
2 Data
We construct the list of all ETFs from the CRSP stock database identified by their share
code of 73. Then, we merge this list with the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund
database by the CUSIP number and only keep funds with etf flag of “F” to make sure that
the sample has only ETFs. The CRSP stock database has the record of every ETF’s daily
price, return and trading volume, while the CRSP mutual fund database provides fund
name, ETF sponsor name, net asset value (NAV) and portfolio holdings. From Bloomberg,
we obtain each ETF’s benchmark index, leverage, and number of shares outstanding, is
from Bloomberg.2 It also classifies ETFs by the type of assets an ETF invests in, including
equity, fixed income, commodity, alternative, mixed allocation, and specialty. Institutional
ownership is obtained from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database (i.e., 13F
filings to the SEC).
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number of ETFs and their total market capitalization.
The first ETF, SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPY), was created on January 22nd, 1993.
Levered ETFs were invented much later. On June 19th, 2006, ProShares issued the first
four pairs of levered ETFs. At the end of our sample, December 31st, 2014, there are 1200
regular ETFs and 352 levered ETFs, and the total market size are $1.9 trillion for regular
2Both CRSP and Bloomberg contain data on total number of shares outstanding, but CRSP data updated
weekly or bi-monthly while Bloomberg has daily updates.
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ETFs and over $30 billion for levered ETFs.
Panels B and C report the summary statistics of monthly variables for regular and
levered ETFs, respectively. Return refers to an ETF’s monthly return based on exchange
traded prices and adjusted for distributions. NAV Return refers to an ETF’s monthly
returns calculated using the fund’s net asset value and adjusted for distributions. Spread
is the closing bid-ask spread, i.e., the closing ask price minus the closing bid price divided
by the average of the bid and ask prices, at the end of the month. The median of Spread
is 18 basis points for regular ETFs, while 24 basis points for levered ETFs. Turnover, the
monthly turnover rate, has a median of 0.23 for regular ETFs and a much higher median,
1.52, for levered ETFs. Ln Illiq is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (i.e.,
the absolute value of daily return to the dollar amount daily volume in $billion) during a
month. Flow refers to the ratio of net capital flow to the total net assets at the beginning
of the month. Cap is the total market capitalization in $billion. The median size is only
$10 million for regular ETFs and $3 million for levered ETFs. Ln Cap is the log of Cap.
Premium is the month-end closing price divided by month-end NAV minus one. On average,
for both regular and levered ETFs, Premium is relatively small (i.e., a median of 3 basis
points for regular and 0 for levered ETFs). But the standard deviation of Premium is
sizeable (58 basis points for regular and 51 basis points for levered ETFs). Index Vol is
the standard deviation of daily returns of an ETF’s underlying index during the month.
IO refers to institutional ownership, the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional
investors at the most recent quarter end. The median IO is 23.05% for regular ETFs, and
is merely 3.65% for levered ones, indicating that levered ETF investors are predominantly
retail investors. Finally, due to the concern that extreme outliers are caused by erroneous





One prominent theory of financial innovation emphasizes the motive to create “informa-
tion insensitive” securities to reduce adverse selection and enhance market liquidity. For
example, according to Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), since index returns are less sensitive
to firm-specific information, ETFs should be less subjective to adverse selection, and have
better market liquidity than their underlying stocks. This idea has also been applied to
other issues such as security design DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and banking Dang et al
(2014). However, we are not aware of any empirical test of this prediction.
We conduct the test of this prediction on regular ETFs, and report the results in Panel
A of Table 2. It shows that regular ETFs are significantly more liquid than their underlying
stocks. Specifically, for each regular ETF, we identify the index that the ETF tracks, and
the underlying stocks for that index. As shown in the first row, the market capitalization
weighted average turnover of the underlying stocks is 21% per month. In contrast, the
average turnover for ETFs is 235% per month. That is, on average, ETF shares are traded
more than twice each month. The t-statistic for the difference in turnover is 8.8. Moreover,
the average bid-ask spread is only 5.0 basis points for the ETFs, and 8.0 basis points for
their underlying stocks, with the t-statistic for the difference being 3.4. Finally, the last
column shows that the average of the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) liquidity ratio is
−2.85 for ETFs, and −2.53 for their underlying stocks, with a t-statistic for the difference
being 6.4. Note that the liquidity ratio measures the price impact in a market. A lower
liquidity ratio means a smaller price impact, and hence a higher market liquidity. That is,
the evidence in the regular ETF market is consistent with the prediction from Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990): compared to the underlying stocks, regular ETFs are more liquid—they
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have higher turnover, smaller bid-ask spreads and smaller price impact.
However, levered ETFs appear to be exactly the opposite of the prediction of the above
adverse-selection-based theory: they increase, rather than decrease, information sensitiv-
ity. This is unusual since levered ETFs are mostly marketed to retail investors, who are
presumably less informed. How does this affect their market liquidity?
To address this issue, we identify all indices on which there exist both regular and
levered ETFs. In this subsample, as shown in Panel B, the average turnover is 2.68 times
per month for regular ETFs, but is 6.42 times per month for levered ETFs; the t-statistics
for the difference is 5.2. That is, the turnover in the levered ETF market is several times
higher than that in the regular ETF market. Note that due to the embedded leverage,
investors’ “effective” turnover is even larger. Suppose, for example, the leverage is 2. If an
investor acquires $1 of the ETF, it is equivalent to buying $2 of the corresponding regular
ETF. The third row shows that after adjusting for the embedded leverage, the effective
turnover is 13.58. That is, this is equivalent to turnover the regular ETFs 163 times a year.
The above evidence suggests that levered ETFs are traded extremely actively. The
average holding time is around 3 business days. However, this does not imply that the
levered ETF market is more liquid. For example, the second column shows that levered
ETFs have significantly higher bid-ask spreads. Holding underlying indices constant, the
average bid-ask spread is 3.1 basis points for regular ETFs, but is 9.9 basis points for
levered ones, with a t-statistic for the difference being 8.5. Note that due to the embedded
leverage, to adjust for a certain amount of exposure, investors do not have to trade as much.
Even after taking into account of this, the leverage adjusted bid-ask spread is still 5.4 basis
points. The t-statistic for the difference between a regular ETF’s bid-ask spread and the
leverage-adjusted bid-ask spread of a levered ETF is 7.2. The third column shows that the
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price impact in the levered ETF market is significantly larger. The average log liquidity
ratio is −4.10 and −1.86 for regular and levered ETFs, respectively. The t-statistics for the
difference is 14.8. Even after adjusting for the embedded leverage, the price impact is still
significantly larger in the levered ETF market, implying that the levered ETF market is
less liquid.
In summary, the levered ETF market is not as liquid as the heavy turnover implies.
The overall evidence suggests that, despite their iliquidity, levered ETFs seem appealing
to some investors who have very short investment horizons. This is consistent with some
recent studies that emphasize the role of financial innovation in facilitating speculation (e.g.,
Frazzini and Pedersen, (2012), Simsek (2012) and Shen, Yan and Zhang (2012)).
3.2 Cost Measure
The heavy trading in the levered ETF market, despite the large bid-ask spreads and price
impacts, implies that investors must have incurred a large cost. We try to quantify the
cost in this section. The special structure of ETF pairs offers a nice way to make cost
assessment. ETF sponsors usually issue levered ETF pairs for each index: one ETF aims to
provide x-time (x = 2, 3) daily return of the index, while the other aims to provide −x-time
daily return of the same index. Consider a portfolio which invests $1 in each ETF, and
re-balances daily to keep the same exposure to the two ETFs. For convenience, we refer
to this portfolio as a “long-long” portfolio. If the two ETFs deliver the returns they are
designed to provide, the return of the long-long portfolio should be zero regardless of the
underlying index return. That is, it is a zero-sum game between the investor of the x-time
ETF and that of the −x-time ETF. Perhaps due to market frictions and management fees,
the realized returns of the long-long portfolio can differ from 0, and so provide a measure
of the cost to investors in levered ETFs.
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Table 3 reports the returns of this long-long portfolio. The first column of Panel A shows
that during our sample from 2006 to 2014, the average return of the long-long portfolio is
−2.31% per year, with a t-statistic of 4.9. Hence, one can interpret this as levered ETF
investors paying a cost of 2.31% a year. An implicit assumption behind the above cost
measure is that the total market capitalization for the x-time ETF is the same as that
for the −x-time ETF, while in reality the sizes of the two ETFs are often imbalanced.
To examine if this violation meaningfully affects the cost measure, we make the following
adjustment. We calculate the long-long strategy return for each pair of ETFs as the average
return of the pair, weighted by each ETF’s market capitalization on the previous day. We
then take an average of the long-long strategy returns across all pairs, weighted by the total
market cap of each pair. This adjustment barely changes the cost measure.
Columns 2–4 report the long-long portfolio returns by the categories of the underlying
indices. Since most of our ETFs are based on stock indices, the long-long strategy loss for
stock ETFs is almost the same as that in the overall sample. The long-long strategy loss
is smaller for bond ETFs, −1.76% (t = 7.5), and is larger for commodity ETFs, −6.38%
(t = 4.5).
What determines the long-long strategy return? First, levered ETFs attempt to track
daily returns of underlying indices with x-time leverage (x = ±2, 3). Thus, they must adjust
their underlying portfolio at a relative high frequency to keep their leverage ratios fixed.
The transaction costs associated with the adjustments erode the net asset values (NAVs),
and contribute to the low return from the long-long strategy. Following this intuition, we
expect that the long-long strategy loss to be larger for 3-time levered ETF pairs, and for
the pairs based on more volatile indices. As shown in Panel B of Table 3, the average
long-long strategy return is −6.18% for 3-time ETF pairs and is −2.79% for 2-time pairs.
Moreover, we sort ETFs based on the past month volatility of their underlying indices into
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two groups. The average long-long strategy return is −3.83% for the pairs in the high
group, and is only −0.93% for the low group. In both cases, the cross-sectional differences
are highly significant, both statistically and in economic terms. Second, part of the long-long
strategy loss could be due to the overpricing of levered ETFs relative to their NAVs. Table
1 shows that although the average premium is within one basis point, there is significant
variation overtime. We sort ETF pairs by their last month average premium. Panel A
also shows that the long-long strategy loss is higher for the group with higher past month
premium. Finally, the table also provides some evidence that the long-long strategy loss
increases with market cap and the last month turnover of the ETF pairs. We don’t find
evidence that the long-long return changes with institutional ownership.
Note that the long-long strategy return is not the total cost for investors to access
the opportunity for levered speculation. For example it does not include the transaction
costs investors face when they frequently trade the levered ETFs in the secondary market.
In our sample, the market cap weighted average turnover of levered ETFs is around 6.42
times per month. Hence, a bid-ask spread of 9.9 basis points implies a transaction cost of
roughly 7.63% (= 6.42 × 12 × 9.9 b.p.) per year. Therefore, the total cost that levered
ETF investors incur is, at least, 9.94% (=2.31%+7.63%) per year. This amounts to over $2
billion for the market size towards the end of our sample. As a comparison, for the overall
financial market, according to French (2008), “investors spend 0.67% of the aggregate value
of the market each year searching for superior returns.”
3.3 Investor Behavior
The above evidence suggests that regular and levered ETFs are markedly different financial
innovations. While regular ETFs improve market liquidity levered ones appear to attract
retail investors who are interested in short-term speculations, and trade heavily despite
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large bid-ask spreads and price impacts. In this section, we examine if regular and levered
ETF investors display different trading behavior.
It is easy to see that regular and levered ETFs have different investor bases. For instance,
as shown in Table 1, the median institutional ownership is 23% for regular ETFs, but is
merely 3.65% for levered ETFs. That is, the levered ETF market is dominated by individual
investors.
How do investors react to past returns? The first three columns of Table 4 suggest that,
in aggregate, regular ETF investors are momentum traders. Specifically, we regress the
monthly fund flow of an ETF on its return during the previous month. The first column
shows that the coefficient is 0.431 (t = 10.08). That is, a one percent increase is the return
of the ETF is associated with a 43.1 basis point increase in the flow to the fund next
month. The second and third columns show that the fund flow responses are persistent.
For example, the coefficient to the return at month t− 2 is 0.127 (t = 3.987): a one percent
increase is the return of the ETF is associated with a 12.7 basis point increase in the flow
to the fund three month later.
In contrast, levered ETF investors appear to be contrarian: Monthly fund flows to
levered ETFs are strongly negatively correlated with previous month returns. Column
seven to nine report the results from a panel regression of monthly flows to levered ETFs
on their past month returns. In column seven, the coefficient of return in month t is −0.124
(t = 2.359). That is, a one percent increase in the levered ETF return is accompanied by
a 12.4 basis point more outflow in the next month. Columns eight and nine examine the
persistence of this flow. Consistent with our interpretation that levered ETFs primarily
attract short-term speculators, there is no evidence that fund flows are sensitive to returns
more than one month ago.
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We also examine a subset of regular ETFs, whose indices also have levered ETFs. For
convenience, we call it the “matched sample.” Presumably, levered ETFs are established
on indices that investors are interested in speculating on. If those short-term speculators
also trade in the regular ETFs, it should weaken the momentum behavior we have seen for
the overall sample. Indeed, as we can see in columns four to six, the coefficient for return
in month t is still positive and highly significant statistically, its magnitude is reduced to
half.
Finally, to examine if the fund flows are “justified,” i.e., if they can predict future returns,
we regress an ETF’s return on its fund flow in the previous month. As shown in column
one of Table 5, fund flow has no predictive power for regular ETFs. The coefficient for Flow
is almost zero with a t-statistic of 0.085. Moreover, for levered ETFs, fund flows are in the
“wrong” direction. As shown in column seven, the coefficient for flow is −0.0566 (t = 3.05).
That is, a higher flow to a levered ETF implies a lower future fund return. Finally, for the
matched sample, the coefficient for flow is negative but statistically insignificant. That is,
our evidence suggests that fund flows are not justified by future returns. If anything, there
is some evidence that levered ETF investors move their allocations to the wrong direction.
3.4 Arbitrage
There is a well-established arbitrage mechanism in the ETF market. Through share cre-
ation and redemption, arbitrageurs can profit from deviations of ETF prices from NAVs.
Moreover, both prices and NAVs of most ETFs can be accurately measured at the daily
frequency. This offers a rich set of data to empirically examine the deviations of prices from
fundamental values in a dynamic setup.
We have noted earlier in Table 1 that the average premium in our sample is less than one
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basis point, suggesting that arbitrage forces are effective in bringing ETF prices towards
their NAVs and that there is no mispricing on average. How does the ETF price track its
NAV over time?
To examine this question, we regress the ETF return on its contemporaneous NAV
return. We restrict our sample to US equity ETFs only.3 If the ETF price is perfectly
pegged to its NAV, the coefficient for the NAV returns should be 1. However, the first
column of Table 6 shows that the coefficient for NAV return is 0.943, which is significantly
different from 1 (t = 9.4). It implies that when the ETF’s fundamental value increases
(decreases) by 1%, its price goes up (down) by only 94 basis points on average.
The above evidence shows that arbitrage forces cannot perfectly peg the price of an
ETF to its NAV. Rather, NAV is the “moving target”, to which arbitrage forces partially
push the ETF price. This is a sensible strategy when arbitrageurs face costs when setting
up their trades, similar to the intuition in the literature of optimal portfolio choice with
transaction costs. For example, Garleanu and Pedersen (2012) find that in an environment
with predictable return and transaction costs, the optimal strategy is to “trade partially
towards the current aim”.
This interpretation also suggests that when arbitrage cost is smaller, the ETF price
should track its NAV more closely. We test this by comparing regular ETFs with levered
ones. To the extent that arbitrage is more costly for levered ETFs, the coefficient for NAV
return should be smaller for levered ETFs than that for regular ones. The second column of
Table 6 shows that this is indeed the case. The coefficient for NAV Return is 0.975, and the
coefficient for the interaction term Levered×NAV Return is −0.034 (t = 3.2), suggesting
3ETF returns are calculated based on prices recorded at 4pm. However, NAVs may be recorded at
different time for ETFs on some asset classes such as currency and commodity. This dissynchronization
creates problems for our inferences. Hence, we restrict our sample to ETFs based on US equities, where
both prices and NAVs are recorded at the same time.
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that the coefficient for NAV Return is 0.975 for regular ETFs and 0.941 (=0.975-0.034)
for levered ones. That is, due to the higher arbitrage costs, levered ETF prices track their
NAVs less closely.
4 Conclusion
We have documented that regular and levered ETFs are markedly difference financial in-
novations. Consistent with the adverse selection-based theory of financial innovation, we
find that regular ETFs are more liquid than their underlying stocks, i.e., they have higher
turnover, lower bid-ask spreads and price impact. In contrast, levered ETFs seem to aim
for the opposite. Controlling for the underlying indices, the turnover in the levered ETF
market is several times higher than that in the regular ETF market. However, this does
not imply that the levered ETF market is more liquid, as we also find that levered ETFs
have significantly higher bid-ask spreads and larger price impact.
Our interpretation is that regular and levered ETFs attract different investor bases.
Regular ETFs attract investors with a motive for liquidity and diversification. Levered
ETFs appear to attract investors who are interested in short-term levered speculations
(their average holding period is around 3 days). They pay a substantial cost for their
speculations—around 10% of the market capitalization, or over $2 billion, each year. More-
over, regular and levered ETF investors display different trading behaviors. Regular ETF
investors appear to be momentum traders, while levered ETF investors are contrarians:
For regular ETFs, monthly fund flows are strongly positively correlated with ETF returns
during the previous several months. In contrast, for levered ETFs, monthly fund flows are
strongly negatively correlated with their past month returns.
Finally, we find that the average premium in our sample is less than one basis point,
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suggesting that arbitrage forces are effective in bringing ETF prices towards their NAVs
and that there is no mispricing on average. However, our evidence shows that arbitrage
forces cannot perfectly peg the price of an ETF to its NAV. Rather, NAV is the “moving
target”, to which arbitrage forces partially push the ETF price. Due to limits of arbitrage,
ETF prices only gradually converge to their fundamental values, and the convergence is
slower for levered ETFs than for regular ones.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables in our analysis.  Panel A reports the number of ETFs and total market 
capitalization (in billion $) by leverage ratios at the end of each year from 2006 to 2014. Panel B reports the time-series averages 
of monthly cross-sectional statistics of each variable for regular ETFs.  Return is the monthly return of levered ETFs 
compounded from daily returns.  NAV Return is the monthly return that is compounded from hypothetical daily returns computed 
based on daily NAVs.  Spread is the month-end closing bid-ask spread, ask price minus bid price divided by the average of bid 
and ask prices.  Turnover is the sum of daily share turnover rate within each month.  Ln Illiq is the log of the average of the ratio 
of the absolute value of daily returns to trading volume (in billion $) on each day of the month.  Flow is the monthly capital flow 
rate.  Cap is the market capitalization at the end of the month, denoted in $ billion.  Ln Cap is the natural log of market 
capitalization in dollars.  IO is the most recent report of institutional ownership from 13F filings.  Premium is the month-end 
price to NAV ratio minus one.  Index Vol is standard deviation of daily returns of ETF’s benchmark index. Panel C reports 
summary statistics of these variables for levered and inverse ETFs.  Turnover, Spread, Flow and Premium are winsorized within 
all ETF sample at both 1% and 99% level at each cross-section.  The sample period spans from 2006/07 to 2014/12. 
 
Panel A: # of ETFs and Market size by the end of each year 
    
 
# of ETFs 
Year 
Regular ETFs  Levered ETFs 
Total 
1x long  1x short 2x long 2x short 3x long 3x short 
2006 359  4 4 4 0 0 383 
2007 561  9 26 30 0 0 691 
2008 657  11 37 43 7 7 867 
2009 702  12 42 48 13 13 958 
2010 810  16 44 43 23 23 1108 
2011 971  25 47 45 27 27 1313 
2012 1030  26 47 45 27 23 1366 
2013 1099  27 46 44 31 27 1449 
2014 1200  27 50 44 32 23 1552 
 
Sum of Market Capitalization ($B) 
Year 
Regular ETFs  Levered ETFs 
Total 
1x long  1x short 2x long 2x short 3x long 3x short 
2006 425.0  0.4 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 429.4 
2007 602.3  0.6 2.2 6.2 0.0 0.0 620.3 
2008 514.9  1.0 8.5 8.5 0.6 0.3 552.6 
2009 745.6  3.2 6.8 12.2 2.7 2.4 799.9 
2010 964.9  3.7 7.7 11.6 4.4 2.8 1025.3 
2011 1009.9  5.3 6.4 10.0 4.8 3.2 1069.4 
2012 1306.5  4.5 7.4 7.7 4.5 2.8 1360.4 
2013 1643.1  4.8 10.1 9.1 5.9 3.1 1709.2 





Panel B: Summary statistics of monthly variables for regular ETFs 
   ETF Variables Mean St Dev P10 P25  P50 P75 P90 
Return 0.50% 3.82% -3.79% -1.60% 0.48% 2.56% 4.80% 
NAV Return 0.49% 3.73% -3.70% -1.55% 0.50% 2.51% 4.67% 
Spread 0.398% 0.660% 0.046% 0.092% 0.184% 0.393% 0.89% 
Turnover 0.57 1.29 0.08 0.13 0.23 0.46 1.03 
Ln Illiq 2.41 2.94 -1.69 0.48 2.59 4.66 6.18 
Flow 4.64% 19.72% -5.85% -0.82% 0.02% 5.02% 17.77% 
Cap ($B) 1.15 4.96 6.76 0.02 0.10 0.50 2220.96 
Ln Cap 4.73 2.12 1.99 3.05 4.62 6.18 7.68 
Premium 0.06% 0.58% -0.53% -0.16% 0.03% 0.28% 0.69% 
Index Vol 1.35% 2.41% 0.62% 0.98% 1.23% 1.51% 1.88% 
IO 30.90% 28.16% 4.83% 12.14% 23.05% 41.74% 64.55% 
        
# of months 102       
# of ETFs 803.1       
Panel C: Summary statistics of monthly variables for levered ETFs 
   ETF Variables Mean St Dev P10 P25  P50 P75 P90 
Return -0.67% 10.77% -13.02% -8.29% -0.91% 6.88% 12.05% 
NAV Return -0.66% 10.76% -13.00% -8.23% -0.82% 6.95% 12.03% 
Spread 0.390% 0.515% 0.047% 0.102% 0.241% 0.478% 0.852% 
Turnover 3.41 4.21 0.39 0.71 1.52 4.19 10.90 
Ln Illiq 2.28 2.85 -1.69 0.02 2.63 4.61 5.80 
Flow 10.29% 28.47% -15.10% -1.98% 3.68% 17.42% 42.44% 
Cap ($B) 0.18 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.47 
Ln Cap  3.70 1.68 1.73 2.32 3.42 4.96 6.09 
Premium  -0.01% 0.51% -0.49% -0.20% 0.00% 0.19% 0.47% 
Index Vol  1.35% 0.51% 0.89% 1.08% 1.27% 1.52% 1.89% 
IO 11.15% 18.75% 0.00% 0.00% 3.65% 15.53% 33.39% 
        
# of months 102 




Table 2. Liquidity of ETF Portfolios, Regular ETFs, and Levered ETFs 
 
This table compares three liquidity measures of regular ETFs with their underlying assets and the corresponding levered and 
inverse ETFs.  Turnover, Spread and Ln Illiq are defined in Table 1 and are also winsorized within all ETF sample at both 1% 
and 99% level at each cross-section.  In Panel A, we restrict to a subsample of regular ETFs whose underlying portfolio 
information is available.  For regular ETF, the liquidity measures of its underlying portfolio are calculated as the mean of the 
liquidity measures of the assets in the portfolio, value-weighted by each asset’s weight in portfolio (Ln Illiq is the log of the 
average illiquidity ratio of all assets in an ETF portfolio). In each month, we calculate the average of the liquidity measure for all 
regular ETFs and their underlying portfolios, value-weighted by an ETF’s market capitalization at the end of the previous month. 
Diff: Normal – Underlying is the difference between the means of the liquidity measures of regular ETFs and their underlying 
portfolios. In Panel B, we restrict to a subsample where all the underlying indices have ETFs in both categories, i.e., normal 
versus levered/inverse.  If multiple ETFs on an index in the same category, we aggregate the liquidity measures of these ETFs by 
their value-weighted averages, weighted by the market capitalization of these ETFs at the end of the previous month. Then, for 
each category, we obtain a time series of the three liquidity measures by taking a value-weighted average across all indices, 
weighted by the sum of market capitalization of all ETFs tracking the same index.  We adjust Turnover by multiplying an ETF’s 
level of leverage and adjust Spread and Illiquidity by dividing an ETF’s level of leverage.  Diff: Normal – Levered is the 
difference between the means of the liquidity measures of normal and levered ETFs.  Diff: Normal – Levered (w/ adjustment) is 
the difference between the means of the liquidity measures of regular ETFs and adjusted liquidity measures of levered ETFs. T -
statistics are reported in parenthesis. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with a 3-month lag and reported in parenthesis. The 
sample is from 2006/07 to 2014/12.  
 
Panel A: Regular ETFs versus their underlying assets  
  
 
Turnover Spread Ln Illiq  
Underlying Assets Mean 0.21 0.080% -2.53 
St. Dev. 0.06 0.092% 0.34 
Regular ETFs Mean 2.35 0.050% -2.85 
St. Dev. 1.39 0.045% 0.36 
Diff: Normal – Underlying  2.14 -0.030% -0.32 
 
(8.8) (-3.4) (-6.4) 
    
# of months 102   




Panel B: Normal versus levered ETFs  
  
 
Turnover Spread Ln Illiq  
Regular ETFs Mean 2.68 0.031% -4.10 
St. Dev. 1.56 0.026% 0.34 
Levered ETFs Mean 6.42 0.099% -1.86 
St. Dev. 5.08 0.070% 0.60 
Levered ETFs  
(w/ adjustment for leverage) 
Mean 13.58 0.054% -2.50 
St. Dev. 9.98 0.038% 0.64 
Diff: Normal – Levered/Inverse 3.73 0.068% 2.24 
 
(5.2) (8.5) (14.8) 
Diff: Normal – Levered (w/ adjustment) 10.90 0.022% 1.60 
 
(6.8) (7.2) (10.2) 
    
# of months 102     





Table 3. Long-long portfolio returns 
 
Panel A reports the Long-Long strategy return for levered ETFS for the overall sample, and subsamples for stock ETFs, bond 
ETFs, and commodity ETFs. The Long-Long strategy return is average daily returns of each matched long-short levered ETF pair.  
All means are value weighted by ETFs total market capitalization at the end of previous trading day. Panel B sort the matched 
levered ETFs sample on each pair’s last month Turnover, Cap, Index Vol, Leverage, and Premium.  All variables are defined as 
in Table 1.  Each month all pairs of levered ETFs are sorted into two halves (High and Low) based on each variable, then 
implement daily rebalanced long-long strategy within each group. All means are value weighted by each pair’s total market 
capitalization at the end of previous trading day. Returns are annualized and Newey-West t-statistics with lag of 20-day are 
reported in parenthesis.  The sample period spans from 2006/07 to 2014/12. 
 
 
Panel A: Long-long portfolio return of paired levered ETFs     
 All Stock Bond Commodity 
Long-Long return -2.31% -2.26% -1.76% -6.38% 
 
(-4.9) (-5.1) (-7.5) (-4.5) 
     
# of days 2140 2,132 1438 1534 




Panel B: Return of long-long portfolios sorted on characteristics 
 Sort on: High Low High - Low # of days 
Leverage -6.18% -2.79% -3.39% 1548 
  (-5.7) (-6.9) (-4.2) 
 
Index Vol -3.83% -0.93% -2.87% 2118 
  (-4.5) (-3.4) (-4.2) 
 
Premium -3.57% -1.73% -1.84% 2118 
  (-4.5) (-3.0) (-2.6) 
 
Turnover -2.49% -1.18% -1.34% 2,118 
  (-4.8) (-3.4) (-3.2) 
 
Cap -2.39% -1.93% -0.47% 2118 






Table 4. Sensitivity of ETF Flows to Past Returns 
 
This table presents the result of regressions of ETF flows on past returns.  We regress a ETF’s Flow at month t+1 on its past 
returns up to six months, controlling for the ETF’s Ln Cap, Turnover, Index Vol, Ln Illiq, and Premium at month t.  Month times 
Category fixed effects are also included (but not reported) in the regressions.  Category classifies ETFs by the type of assets an 
ETF invests in, including equity, fixed income, commodity, alternative, mixed allocation, and specialty. Variables are defined as 
in Table 1.  In columns (1) to (3), the regression is running on the sample of all regular ETFs, in columns (4) to (6) the regression 
is running on a matched subsample of regular ETFs whose underlying index also have levered or inverse ETFs, and in columns 
(7) to (9) the regression is running on the sample of levered ETFs. Standard errors are double clustered by ETF and by month, 
and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The sample period spans from 2006/07 to 2014/12. 
 
 
 Dep. Var.: Flowt+1 All Regular ETFs Matched Regular ETFs Levered ETFs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Returnt 0.431 0.439 0.431 0.221 0.256 0.247 -0.124 -0.120 -0.107 
  (10.1) (10.4) (10.3) (3.3) (4.1) (3.9) (-2.3) (-2.2) (-2.0) 
Returnt-1   0.155 0.159   0.0754 0.0968   -0.0383 -0.0411 
    (4.4) (4.8)   (0.9) (1.2)   (-0.9) (-1.0) 
Returnt-2   0.134 0.127   0.0965 0.123   -0.0157 -0.0206 
    (4.0) (3.9)   (1.6) (2.6)   (-0.3) (-0.4) 
Returnt-3     0.0233     -0.0357     -0.00335 
      (0.9)     (-0.8)     (-0.1) 
Returnt-4     0.0140     -0.0147     -0.000789 
      (0.4)     (-0.3)     (-0.02) 
Returnt-5     0.00737     0.0140     -0.0152 
      (0.2)     (0.3)     (-0.3) 
Ln Capt -0.0596 -0.0476 -0.0394 -0.0189 -0.0148 -0.0102 -0.0769 -0.0725 -0.0675 
 
(-15.5) (-15.0) (-14.0) (-3.7) (-3.4) (-3.2) (-8.9) (-9.2) (-8.9) 
Turnovert 0.00194 -0.00106 -0.000762 0.00268 0.00154 0.00146 0.00388 0.00296 0.00177 
 
(0.7) (-0.5) (-0.4) (1.6) (0.9) (1.0) (2.5) (1.9) (1.4) 
Index Volt -0.0187 -0.0133 -0.0185 -1.566 -0.781 -0.421 4.850 4.344 4.156 
 
(-4.9) (-4.0) (-3.4) (-2.2) (-1.3) (-0.8) (5.2) (6.2) (6.3) 
Ln Illiq t -0.0386 -0.0308 -0.0254 -0.00873 -0.00627 -0.00381 -0.0378 -0.0363 -0.0342 
 
(-14.4) (-13.9) (-12.7) (-2.5) (-2.1) (-1.7) (-7.3) (-7.8) (-8.1) 
Premiumt 3.146 2.641 2.390 0.880 0.658 0.565 1.860 1.787 1.662 
 
(8.3) (8.6) (8.1) (1.7) (1.4) (1.3) (3.1) (2.3) (2.3) 
 
         
Month*Category  Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.121 








Table 5. Return Predictability of ETF Flows  
 
This table presents the result of regressions of ETF future returns on ETF flows.  We regress a ETF’s future Returns over a month, 
over a quarter, and over a year relative to month t, separately, on the ETF’s Flow at t, controlling for past returns, Ln Cap, 
Turnover, Index Vol, Ln Illiq, and Premium at month t. Month times Category fixed effects are also included (but not reported) in 
the regressions.  Category classifies ETFs by the type of assets an ETF invests in, including equity, fixed income, commodity, 
alternative, mixed allocation, and specialty. Variables are defined as in Table 1.  In columns (1) to (3), the regression is running 
on the sample of all regular ETFs, in columns (4) to (6) the regression is running on a matched subsample of regular ETFs whose 
underlying index also have levered or inverse ETFs, and in columns (7) to (9) the regression is running on the sample of levered 
ETFs. Standard errors are double clustered by ETF and by month, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The sample period 
spans from 2006/07 to 2014/12. 
 
 








  All Regular ETFs Matched Regular ETFs Levered ETFs 
 Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Future Return Month Quarter Year Month Quarter Year Month Quarter Year 
Flowt 0.000188 -0.00505 -0.0177 -0.0112 -0.0183 -0.0111 -0.0566 -0.0793 -0.0613 
  (0.09) (-1.2) (-1.9) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-0.5) (-3.0) (-3.2) (-1.0) 
Returnt 0.0680 0.106 0.195 0.0404 0.0221 0.0671 -0.00451 0.0569 0.159 
  (1.9) (1.8) (1.5) (0.7) (0.2) (0.4) (-0.04) (0.4) (0.5) 
Returnt-1 to t-11  0.0110 0.0149 0.119 0.00525 -0.00703 0.106 0.0189 0.0500 0.299 
  (1.2) (0.8) (3.4) (0.4) (-0.3) (1.4) (0.9) (1.3) (3.6) 
Ln Capt 0.000274 0.00150 0.00778 0.000851 0.00251 0.0137 0.00370 0.0238 0.105 
 
(0.7) (1.6) (2.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.9) (0.6) (2.0) (3.1) 
Turnovert -0.000189 -0.000127 0.00228 0.000123 0.000390 0.00429 -0.00148 -0.00396 -0.00703 
 
(-0.9) (-0.2) (1.2) (0.4) (0.5) (1.5) (-1.9) (-2.7) (-1.6) 
Index Volt -0.109 -0.223 0.683 -0.214 -0.675 -0.573 -0.408 -0.805 0.0164 
 
(-0.5) (-0.5) (0.7) (-0.6) (-1.0) (-0.3) (-1.7) (-0.7) (0.003) 
Ln Illiq t 5.49e-05 0.000727 0.00561 0.000995 0.00290 0.0140 0.00102 0.0100 0.0523 
 
(0.2) (1.1) (2.3) (1.9) (1.9) (2.4) (0.3) (1.5) (2.8) 
Premiumt -0.513 -0.525 -0.988 -0.196 0.496 0.193 -0.179 1.041 -1.049 
 
(-4.6) (-2.1) (-1.8) (-0.8) (1.1) (0.2) (-0.2) (0.7) (-0.3) 
           
Month*Category Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.65 0.66 0.654 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.03 0.05 0.17 
Observations 57,697 55,420 46,043 4,709 4,551 3,851 9,939 9,571 7,991 
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Table 6. Regression of ETFs’ price returns on NAV returns 
 
The dependent variable is daily ETF price Return on day t. The independent variables are NAV Return at day t and Premium at 
day t-1 in column (1).  In column (2) the independent variable also includes a dummy variable, Levered, which equals one if it is 
a levered or inverse ETFs, and an interaction term of Levered and NAV Return.  The regressions restrict to a subsample where all 
the underlying indices have both regular ETFs and levered ETFs.  The sample only includes U.S. equity ETFs and is from 
2006/07 to 2014/12. Standard errors are double clustered by ETF and by date, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis (null 
hypothesis as indicated).  
 
 
Dep. Var.: Returnt (1) (2) 
NAV Returnt 0.943 0.975 
H0: = 1  (-9.4) (-3.3) 
Premiumt-1 -1.071 -1.071 
H0: = -1 (3.3) (3.3) 
Levered   -0.00017 
H0: = 0   (-3.5) 
Levered × NAV Returnt   -0.0338 
H0: = 0   (-3.2) 
 
    
Day Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
R2 0.96 0.96 
Observations 238,482 238,482 
 
